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 20 a tale of two PandeMics  
in three coUntries
 Portugal, Spain, and Italy
André Peralta- Santos, Luis Saboga- Nunes,  
and Pedro C. Magalhães
On February  20, 2020, a young man admitted to the hospital in 
Italy with COVID-19 marked the start of uncontrolled COVID-19 transmission 
in Eu rope (Livingston & Bucher, 2020). Like other times in the past, Italy played 
the central role in the history of Eu ro pean epidemics: from the Antonine plague, 
described by Galen during the Roman Empire, to Genoa and the Black Death in 
the  fourteenth  century.
Over the next two weeks, in late February and early March 2020, the epidemic 
kept expanding in the Lombardian region in Italy. On March 8, 2020, the Italian 
government implemented a localized lockdown in the region, restricting move-
ment to minimize social contact (Remuzzi & Remuzzi, 2020). The lockdown was 
expanded to the entire country on March 9, 2020.
In Spain, transmission had been underway, mainly undetected, since mid- 
February (Fuertes et al., 2020). On February 28, the Basque Country reported the 
first case, and by March 13, 2020, its regional government declared a health emer-
gency. By then, all the provinces already had cases, motivating the national govern-
ment to issue a royal decree (463/2020), declaring the state of emergency and a 
curfew.
In Portugal, the first cases  were detected on March 2, 2020, in the northern 
regions, with links to Italian cases. The government rapidly convened the National 
Public Health Council, a committee composed of national experts (Peixoto et al., 
2020), to gather advice about the necessary mea sures to control the pandemic. 
This council suggested on March 12 (Gomes, 2020) that no action be taken, but 
the prime minister ignored this advice, and between March  13 and March  16, 
2020, a total lockdown of the country was implemented, even before the first 
death from COVID-19 was registered.
The synchronicity of physical distancing policies between  these south Eu ro-
pean countries hides dif er ent epidemic dynamics, as well as diverse speeds in 
responding to the events. It is also noteworthy that dif er ent structural challenges 
existed when it came to responding to the most challenging health crisis in over a 
 century. The COVID-19 pandemic is remarkable in many ways: first, never before 
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in the history of modern health systems in Eu rope have we witnessed the spectacu-
lar collapse of two of the most regarded national health systems (Arango, 2020; 
Horo witz, 2020; Remuzzi & Remuzzi, 2020), the Italian and the Spanish; second, 
the resilience of the Portuguese health system in the early stages of the pandemic 
was, in many ways, surprising, given de cades of underfunding reinforced by more 
recent austerity policies.
 After the  great lockdown that took place during the months of March and April 
of 2020, the epidemic took another twist in the subsequent months. Spain and Italy 
managed to suppress the transmission to levels of less than 20 cases per 100,000 
inhabitants. Instead, the pandemic resurged in Portugal, in the deprived areas on 
capital suburbs, with reports of outbreaks in factories and among the immigrant 
population. Combined with inefficient contact tracing, this led to a prolonged pla-
teau of the epidemic curve. Although the health system managed to avoid collapse 
at the time, the inability to suppress the transmission led to Portugal’s exclusion 
from the safe travel  bubbles and to consequent damage in the tourism industry.
This chapter explores the structural similarities and diferences between  these 
three countries: on the one hand, in their respective health sectors’ capacities and 
reor ga ni za tion; and on the other hand, in the dif er ent degrees of state capacity to 
respond to the pressing needs of their populations. In the last  great epidemic, the 
1918 flu,  there was a transparent north- south gradient in the extent to which Eu ro-
pean countries  were hit by the pandemic, with Portugal, Spain, and Italy among 
 those that  were hit the hardest (Ansart et al., 2009). How was it this time? To what 
extent does the impact of COVID-19 reflect resilient societal and institutional vul-
nerabilities in  these countries? And to what extent have national specificities inter-
acted with  those shared vulnerabilities, leading to dif er ent outcomes?
Public Health
Public Health Strengths and Vulnerabilities
Italy, Spain, and Portugal’s health systems are financed through general taxa-
tion, are generally  free at the point of care, and provide universal health coverage 
(de Almeida Simões et  al., 2017; García- Armesto et  al., 2010; Lo Scalzo et  al., 
2009). The three national health systems emerged in the late 1970s, in Italy as 
the result of the collapse of the previous social health insurance system and in 
Spain and Portugal as part of their democ ratization. They share some standard 
orga nizational and per for mance features that constitute potential strengths and 
vulnerabilities when facing a pandemic event.
One of the most salient of  these features is the impact of a de cade of fis-
cal austerity. During the  Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis, the govern-
ments of Italy, Spain, and Portugal decreased the bud get available for health 
care (Stuckler et  al., 2017), leading to cuts in long- term infrastructure invest-
ments and making it even more difficult to deal with the prob lem of an aging 
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workforce (Karanikolos et al., 2013; Legido- Quigley et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
compared with northern Eu ro pean countries,  these countries have very efficient 
healthcare systems (Cylus et al., 2017; Perleth et al., 2001). In other words, the 
return in terms of population health is very good for  every Euro invested. How-
ever, in what is only apparently a paradox, efficiency is not an advantage dur-
ing a pandemic. If all the resources are fully optimized, any significant surges in 
demand, such as  those experienced during early March 2020 in Italy and Spain, 
this  favors a collapse of the health system. Portugal seemed especially vulnerable, 
as it had the lowest number of intensive care unit beds per inhabitant in Eu rope 
and one of the lowest levels of investment in public health ser vices in Eu rope 
(Rhodes et al., 2012). In 2015, on average, the countries of the Organ ization for 
Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) allocated 2.8  percent of their 
total healthcare bud get to health promotion and disease prevention. Portugal 
and Spain devoted below 2  percent to prevention, whereas Italy (2.9  percent) was 
above the OECD figure (OECD, 2017).
Another feature impor tant to consider is the governance structure of the 
national health system. Italy and Spain have a rationalized governance model in 
which regions play a more decisive role in the definition of delivery, managing 
 human resources and bud get allocation (García- Armesto et al., 2010; Giovannini 
& Vampa, 2019; Lo Scalzo et al., 2009). In contrast, Portugal has a highly central-
ized health system, with a national agency responsible for bud get, and regional 
health administrations play only a minor role in health system organ ization, serv-
ing mainly as links in the transmission chain  under the command of the national 
level. In theory, Spain and Italy’s regional organ ization has many advantages, such 
as greater flexibility in adjusting delivery to local needs and preferences and an 
increased room for innovative experiences in delivery models. However, during 
a pandemic that requires an unpre ce dented level of coordination and speed, this 
regionalization can be a disadvantage. A centralized governance model such as 
the one in Portugal  will tend to be faster in implementing the dramatic reor ga ni-
za tion that is needed. In sum, efficiency level and governance model are the salient 
features that directly determine the capacity of the health system to respond to 
the pandemic.
Public Health Response to the Pandemic
Why did the Italian and the Spanish health systems collapse in the early stages of 
the pandemic, and not the Portuguese? A quote attributed to Franklin D. Roo-
se velt illustrates one of the reasons for this diference: “I think we consider too 
much the luck of the early bird and not enough the bad luck of the early worm.”1 
Italy and Spain  were the first countries experiencing uncontrolled transmission in 
Eu rope, when a lot was still unknown about the virus, from clinical management 
to the appropriate non- pharmacological interventions. As late as February 2020, 
the ability of this virus to lead to a health system collapse in high- income countries was 
not yet evident. The influential paper by Neil Ferguson, the British mathematician 
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and epidemiologist, stating that only suppression (lockdowns) mea sures would 
prevent health system collapse was published March  16, 2020 (Flaxman et  al., 
2020; Walker et al., 2020). The knowledge transferred by Italian doctors to the 
Eu ro pean medical community was an impor tant  factor in changing clinical prac-
tices and helped health systems elsewhere (Grasselli et al., 2020). In sum, the bad 
luck of being an early worm should not be understated, as countries that  were hit 
 later had the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge transfer from Italy and— 
partially— Spain. Portugal was one of  these countries.
Furthermore, when Italy and Spain had accumulated one hundred cases, their 
levels of mobility  were still close to normal. In contrast, by the time Portugal 
reached the same number of cases, mobility was already more than 30   percent 
below average. The first death attributed to the virus in Italy was reported on 
February 22, 2020. The Italian press was caught by surprise by the quick spread-
ing of the pandemic and did not act in sync with government decisions regarding 
the best ways to prevent the virus to spread. On March 8, 2020, the day before the 
northern region of Lombardy, Italy’s COVID-19 epicenter, went into lockdown, 
Corriere della Sera, Italy’s most widely read newspaper, published an early draft of 
the government decree ordering inhabitants to stay indoors. This leak provoked 
a general upheaval, and more than 41,000  people anticipated their traveling plans 
and moved around the country without any barriers or control. Prime Minister 
Giuseppe Conte was forced (amidst an outcry from some po liti cal parties, echoed 
by the press) to close the country the next day. Similarly, in Spain, wealthy and 
middle- class madrileños flight to their second homes— spreading the virus over 
the weekend before the first state of alarm was declared— had a huge impact in the 
countryside levels of contagion. In contrast, a social self- lockdown was already 
happening in Portugal even before governmental actions, as the media  were sat-
urated with catastrophic news about Spain and Italy.
The diferences in the virulence of the COVID-19 epidemic among Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal are best shown comparing excess mortality from all  causes (Kontis 
et al., 2020). How many more  people are  dying than usual for a specific time of 
the year? Italy and Spain have staggering numbers of 44  percent and 56  percent, 
respectively, and  these numbers hide significant variations between regions (e.g., 
in Madrid the excess mortality is 157  percent higher than usual). In Portugal, the 
excess mortality increased by only 11  percent. This put Portugal close to Germany, 
Austria, and Denmark, countries with some of the best per for mances on this indi-
cator. Hence, diferences between Portugal, on the one hand, and Italy/Spain, on 
the other, are a tale of two pandemics in three countries. At the  earlier stage of 
the pandemic, Portugal managed to protect the population more efficiently and 
avoid the detrimental efects of the collapse of the health system in the COVID-19 
hotspots.
However, in the months right  after the end of the lockdowns, June and 
July 2020, Spain and Italy achieved a level of suppression of transmission never 
achieved by Portugal. On the one hand, Italy and Spain had decreases in mobility 
that  were more severe than in Portugal, whereas “deconfinement”— the return 
This content downloaded from 194.117.18.21 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 11:43:23 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
A Tale of Two Pandemics in Three Countries  365
to a new baseline close to normal— happened faster in Portugal. On the other 
hand, Portugal’s inability to “crush” the epidemic curve in the same way as Italy or 
Spain can also be explained by a public health workforce that was not sufficiently 
large to deal with the pandemic, and by difficulties implementing an efective test- 
trace- isolate- support system. The epidemic in Portugal maintained a “slow burn” 
level in the deprived areas in the outskirts of the Lisbon metropolitan region, in a 
population that was dependent on crowded public transportation, living in sub-
standard housing conditions, and sufering low literacy levels (Instituto Nacional 
de Estatística, 2020). Although the health system was never in danger of collaps-
ing in Portugal, the “slow burn” and the inability to “crush the curve” damaged the 
country’s image of having excelled in pandemic management.
Fi nally, all three countries faced common governance prob lems. Several studies 
have suggested that national variations in the quality of response to the COVID-19 
pandemic across the world seem to be linked to countries’ diferential state capac-
ity (Bosancianu et al., 2020; Liang et al., 2020; Serikbayeva et al., 2020).  Whether 
 these broad cross- sectional snapshots  will find confirmation as more evidence 
emerges and the full consequences of the pandemic unfold is yet to be deter-
mined. However, a priori, none of  these three countries seemed particularly well 
positioned from this point of view. Although commonly used cross- national and 
cross- regional indicators have shown signs of improvement in the quality of gov-
ernance in Portugal and northern Spain (Charron & Lapuente, 2018), government 
efectiveness in all three countries— particularly Italy—is below the average of the 
high- income OECD countries (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
How this played out in the ability to mount an efective public health policy 
response in the three countries can be illustrated in dif er ent ways. In Portu-
gal, as concerns about the spread of infection in nursing homes mounted, it was 
soon “discovered” that  there  were more illegal such establishments in the coun-
try than  legal ones, hosting close to 35,000 older or disabled adults and raising 
enormous challenges for testing, isolation and contact tracing (Penela, 2020). 
In Italy, although approved in mid- April 2020, the “test, trace, and treat” strat-
egy was still not entirely on the ground by mid- June (Capano, 2020), whereas in 
Spain, data collection and contact tracing sufered from lack of expert personnel 
and minimally appropriate information systems (Llaneras, 2020). Although the 
supply of medical material was problematic in many Eu ro pean countries, such 
prob lems  were particularly egregious in Spain, as defective equipment continued 
to be deployed by the Ministry of Health and used by professionals for several 
weeks despite early suspicions (Ramos, 2020). Characteristically, although the Por-
tuguese government approved a plethora of highly detailed rules about “physical 
distancing” as the country abandoned confinement in May 2020, the government 
was ultimately forced to admit that it was “impossible” to enforce some of  those 
rules, particularly  those related to safety in public transportation (Santos, 2020). 
As stated by Saboga- Nunes et  al., the decrease of preventive disease mea sures 
and proactive health promotion strategies is detrimental to the pandemic control 
(Saboga- Nunes, 2020).
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In sum, deficits in  these countries’ “state capacity,” understood as “their ability 
to exert control over their populations and territories, and their ability to for-
mulate and implement policy,” (Bosancianu et al., 2020) encumbered their public 
health response to the crisis.
Social Policy
Socioeconomic and Po liti cal Vulnerabilities
Portugal, Spain, and Italy also share several features that made their socie ties 
and economies particularly vulnerable to the pandemic. The first is a very strong 
economic dependence from the tourism sector. In 2019 the total contribution 
of travel and tourism to the gross domestic product (GDP) of Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal was, respectively, 13   percent, 14   percent, and 17   percent, far above the 
median of high- income countries and, in all cases, only  behind the contribution 
of financial ser vices and— another hard- hit sector— retail (WTTC, 2020). Sec-
ond, a comparatively high proportion of the workforce in  these countries is com-
posed of low- skilled manual and ser vice sector workers (Afonso & Bulfone, 2019) 
as well as by temporary employees (22  percent in Spain, 17  percent in Portugal, 
and 13   percent in Italy, against an EU average of 11   percent) (Eurostat, 2020b). 
That results in large shares of jobs at risk of destruction by the pandemic and 
that cannot be performed remotely (OECD, 2020), and, on the other hand, in 
comparatively high numbers of employees that enjoy  limited social protection 
and job security (Sabat et  al., 2020). Fi nally, the three countries have been fis-
cally constrained for a considerable time. The consequences of the austerity poli-
cies  adopted to address the 2010–2013 financial crisis left a resilient mark in the 
material and  human resources available to their public sectors (Petmesidou et al., 
2014). Although the worst depths of the crisis had been overcome by the end of 
2019, Italy, Portugal, and Spain still had the second, third, and sixth largest public 
debts in the Eu ro pean Union.
The lockdowns that followed the epidemic combined with  these vulnerabili-
ties to generate profoundly negative economic consequences and limit the scope 
and depth of the pos si ble policy responses. On the one hand, during the second 
quarter of 2020, our three countries, along with France, experienced the most sig-
nificant economic contractions among all Eurozone countries (Eurostat, 2020a). 
On the other hand, although their governments provided cash- based transfers, 
wage subsidies, and increased benefits to a variety of vulnerable sectors of the 
population (Gentilini et  al., 2020),  these mea sures represented a significantly 
lower share of each country’s GDP than similar policies in less constrained econo-
mies. Instead, the lion’s share of the fiscal efort in southern Eu rope was devoted 
to deferrals of tax and social security contributions (in Italy and Portugal) and 
credit lines/liquidity guarantees (again in Italy, and to a lesser extent, in Spain) 
This content downloaded from 194.117.18.21 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 11:43:23 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
A Tale of Two Pandemics in Three Countries  367
(Anderson et al., 2020), “a textbook example of what  limited fiscal elbow room 
allows when the rainy days come” (Nicola Rossi, 2020).
Fi nally, in the same way deficits in state capacity encumbered the health policy 
response, they also encumbered the social policy response. In all three countries, 
social and economic support strategies  were afected by inefficiencies and delays. 
In Italy, redundancy funds for employees of small firms and credit guarantees 
for enterprises sufered from extremely cumbersome procedures, with the result 
that, by July 2020, such mea sures had only reached a small number of the poten-
tial beneficiaries (Mascio et al., 2020). In Portugal, the implementation of credit 
lines for enterprises and financial support for self- employed workers was also 
protracted (Andrada, 2020). Meanwhile, unemployment benefits for temporar-
ily redundant workers failed to reach many thousands of beneficiaries in Spain 
(Rodriguez, 2020).
Explanation
The Challenges of Multilevel Governance
 There is, however, one aspect in which our countries difer significantly. As argued 
by Dergiades and  others, “the greater the strength of government interventions 
at an early stage, the more efective  these are in slowing down or reversing the 
growth rate of deaths” (Dergiades et al., 2020; see also Petherick et al., 2020). And 
in this re spect, Portugal benefited not only from avoiding being “the early worm” 
but also from its centralized chain of command, allowing a faster and broader 
implementation of the lockdown mea sures.
Portugal is a unitary state, and one of the most centralized in Eu rope. Although 
the country is divided into regional health authorities, responsible for implement-
ing national health goals, they respond directly to the Ministry of Health, which 
concentrates planning, regulation, and management of the national health ser-
vice. In other words, “[i]n Portugal, most of the health system steering happens at 
a central level” (OECD, 2015). Centralization facilitated a unified and coordinated 
emergency response, and it has also helped deliver one of the Portuguese system’s 
significant strengths, a well- developed, coherent, and rich information infrastruc-
ture (OECD, 2015).
In contrast, in the other two southern Eu ro pean countries, regions (Italy) and 
autonomous communities (Spain) enjoy vast competencies in health care, elder 
care, and economic assistance policies. That has the potential to create coordi-
nation prob lems. In Italy, the regional governments started by completely fail-
ing to implement their regional pandemic plans as requested by the Ministry of 
Health in January. In Lombardy, for example, the regional government leader 
started by downplaying the threat posed by COVID-19 and criticized lockdown 
decisions based on their potential economic consequences. That led the national 
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government to dispense consulting with regions when issuing lockdown deci-
sions (Capano, 2020). Still, despite the explicit advice from experts to declare two 
municipalities in the province of Bergamo as “red zones,” both the central and 
the regional government failed to do so, an omission now is seen as having had 
catastrophic consequences but that both the central and regional governments, 
in typical blame- shifting mode, have assigned to each other’s inaction. A funda-
mental misalignment between the central government and regional authorities 
seems to have contributed to “severely undermine the management of the crisis, 
increase confusion, and create an image of chaos outside” (Ruiu, 2020).
In Spain, the initial coordination prob lems between the seventeen autono-
mous communities and the central government around the closing of schools 
appeared to be solved with the state of emergency decree’s approval on March 14, 
2020 (Jiménez, 2020). However, such prob lems  were soon to make their come-
back. By late March 2020, at the height of the rise in new cases, the much- needed 
reallocation of resources and personnel between regions struck very diferently 
by the pandemic was “a bureaucratic tangle in which, for the moment, no com-
munity wants to get bogged down” (Sevillano & Linde, 2020). Dif er ent proto-
cols and resources for contact tracing, isolation of infected medical professionals, 
and collection and sharing of data about new cases and fatalities contributed to a 
high asymmetry of information and per for mance between communities (Fresno, 
2020). None of this is particularly new: the lack of coordination between health 
ser vices of the dif er ent communities has long been signaled as a pending issue 
in Spain’s healthcare reforms (Sánchez Fierro, 2016), which the pandemic only 
served to bring to fore with par tic u lar intensity (Molina et al., 2020).
Facets of Public Response
How did the publics of  these countries respond to the pandemic crisis and the 
mea sures  adopted to face it? A look at survey data allows us to trace a few similari-
ties and diferences among Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Approval of the government’s management of the pandemic seems to show dif-
fer ent patterns in the three countries. In Portugal, a government whose popularity 
had changed  little since the October 2019 elections experienced a small decisive 
burst  after the pandemic. Studies conducted in both March and May 2020 showed 
that more than 70  percent of respondents trusted the government’s and national 
health authority’s response to the pandemic, an attitude only weakly related to 
partisanship or ideology (Magalhães et al., 2020). The governing party experienced 
a five- point increase in voting intention from February  until May  2020, which 
remained stable  until early August (“Eu rope Elects: Portugal,” 2020). In Italy, the 
government started facing the crisis in a more disadvantaged position, with an 
approval rate below 40  percent and a significant gap in evaluations by partisans 
of the MS5 and Partito Demo cratico in government and by  those of the opposi-
tion parties. Since then, however, the government appears to have benefitted from 
a “rally ‘round the flag” efect (Segatti, 2020) that has dramatically neutralized 
This content downloaded from 194.117.18.21 on Mon, 27 Sep 2021 11:43:23 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
A Tale of Two Pandemics in Three Countries  369
partisan diferences in government evaluations. The primary victim seems to be 
Lega Nord, which experienced a significant drop in the polls in one of hardest 
hit regions by the crisis in Italy. Fi nally, in Spain, no “rally ‘round the flag” efect 
seems to have existed. The approval level of the government’s response to the cri-
sis always stayed below Portuguese and Italian levels (“COVID-29: Government 
 Handling and Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020), and voting intentions for 
the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) and for United We Can (Unidas Podemos), 
the main parties in government, have remained mostly stable. The perception of 
government competence in dealing with the pandemic and how that translates 
to government approval seem to be very heterogeneous in  these three countries. 
However, the unfolding public health and economic situation in all three coun-
tries could change this picture quickly. For example, in a similar poll conducted in 
September 2020, confidence in the Portuguese government’s public response to 
the pandemic had already dropped almost twenty points in relation to May.
A second impor tant dimension concerns the adoption of personal mea sures to 
avoid contagion. Italians and Spaniards led Eu ro pean countries (on which we have 
data) in the use of masks. By late March 2020, 70  percent in Italy, 42  percent in Spain, 
and 27  percent in Portugal reported the use masks in public places, above countries 
such as France, Germany, and, especially, the United Kingdom and Scandinavian 
countries. By May 2020,  these percentages had increased to much higher levels, 
around 80  percent, and have remained mostly stable ever since. Similar patterns 
can be found in the self- reported avoidance of crowded public spaces, increased 
personal hygiene, and avoidance of physical proximity (“COVID-29: Government 
 Handling and Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020). In other words, with a 
lag that approximately fits the staggered severity of the pandemic in each country, 
the self- reported adoption of personal protective mea sures seems generalized in 
the south by July 2020 to a majority of citizens. However, a false sense of safety, 
economic necessity, and deeply ingrained patterns of sociability seem to have con-
spired, at least for a minority of citizens, to reverse some of previous be hav iors. In 
Spain, for example, the resurgence of cases in August was attributed to a return to 
close interpersonal contacts, partying, and social gatherings (Güell, 2020).
A third relevant dimension concerns citizens’ support for the government’s 
mea sures to contain the pandemic. By April  2020, when the epidemic situa-
tion remained most challenging, and all three countries had their most stringent 
mea sures in place, one distinguishing feature of Southern Eu ro pean countries was 
more robust support of their populations for such restrictive mea sures than that 
found among Northern Eu ro pean countries (“COVID-29: Government  Handling 
and Confidence in Health Authorities,” 2020). That could correspond to a worse 
situation on the ground: by mid- April, Spain and Italy  were experiencing, respec-
tively, twelve and eight new COVID-19- related daily casualties per million inhabit-
ants. However, Portugal’s situation was much less dramatic, with about three new 
daily casualties per million, numbers that  were not very dif er ent from  those in 
countries that had less stringent policies at the time, such as Germany or Denmark. 
This suggests— and  will need to be more systematically tested— that cross- national 
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diferences in popu lar support for stringent mea sures seem to be more directly 
related to what government policies happen to be at the moment than with the 
epidemiological situation on the ground. Congruently with this notion, as both 
Spain and Italy started adopting mea sures reversing some aspects of deconfine-
ment in July 2020, support for enforced quarantines, which had been dwindling 
since April 2020, increased again (“COVID-29: Government  Handling and Confi-
dence in Health Authorities,” 2020).
Another (and potentially darker) aspect of this endorsement of government 
policies is vis i ble in the public support for mea sures that might impinge more 
grievously on privacy and personal freedoms. For example, by April 2020, a study 
had already found that the most polarizing issue in Eu rope was the use of mobile 
data for tracking cases and their contacts, with impor tant shares of the population 
in Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany opposing such mea sures. Such use, how-
ever, found greater ac cep tance in Italy or Portugal (Sabat et al., 2020). Similarly, 
a panel study showed that,  after the outbreak, Spaniards became more willing to 
support “strong leaders,” give up individual freedoms, and endorse technocratic 
governance (Amat et  al., 2020). However, as we have discussed previously in 
the case of Spain, although ele ments of po liti cal culture— such as the compara-
tively lower value placed on individual freedom and autonomy in southern than 
in northern Eu rope (Welzel, 2013)— may contribute to produce a more passive 
ac cep tance of government- dictated restrictions, that may not be enough to curtail 
deeply ingrained patterns of sociability.
Po liti cal Polarization
The prob lems faced by Italy and Spain have been compounded by the more intense 
po liti cal rivalry and polarization that can be observed in  those two countries when 
compared to Portugal. In the former, Matteo Salvini, the leader of the populist 
Lega Nord, the party controlling two of the most afected regions— Lombardy and 
Veneto— but out of the co ali tion supporting the national government since Sep-
tember 2019, was intensely critical of the government’s response from the start, 
beginning by downplaying the importance of the pandemic, then criticizing the 
slow response, and  later the delay in ending the lockdown. One study suggests 
that this overt public dissent afected compliance with lockdown  orders: reduc-
tions in mobility—as captured through geolocation data—in response to physical 
distancing  orders  were less sharp in areas with higher vote shares for Lega Nord, 
whereas they  were sharper in areas with higher shares of votes for the largest 
party in government, MS5 (Barbieri & Bonini, 2020). The same efect was seen in 
the United States (Adolph et al., 2020).
In Spain, a background of rising po liti cal acrimony, afective polarization, and 
distance between the po liti cal parties on the country’s crucial ideological issue— 
the territorial cleavage (Alfonso, 2020)— has also played out in the management 
of the COVID-19 crisis. Following a brief period of respite at the height of the 
pandemic, disputes about the extension of lockdowns, strug gles between the gov-
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ernment and nationalist parties around the centralization of health policy, blame- 
shifting between the government and opposition- controlled municipalities, and 
even the refusal of one the major parties— the far- right Vox—to discuss  future 
COVID-19- related mea sures with the government (Gallardo, 2020) have been 
observed. Sánchez, Spain’s prime minister, ultimately evoked Portugal’s case and 
the leader of its opposition party, the PSD, as an example of cooperation that was 
missing in Spain. However, the absence of a territorial cleavage in Portugal, the 
much smaller po liti cal weight of the populist far- right, and a horizon of likely 
governmental stability and distant elections  were background conditions favoring 
a more robust po liti cal consensus that Spain could not replicate.
Tourism and the “Race to the Bottom”
One of the pandemic’s impressive po liti cal dimensions is the impact of the mea-
sures imposed to travelers to and from dif er ent Eu ro pean countries, whereby some 
nations imposed quarantines— not fully endorsed by the scientific community—to 
their own citizens if they had traveled from nations deemed of high risk. The cen-
tral po liti cal aspect that emerges is southern Eu ro pean countries’ willingness to 
take more risks of admitting citizens from other countries with worse incidence 
indicators. That aspect was very salient for Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where no 
travel restrictions  were imposed for countries such as the United Kingdom. That 
shows that the economic relevance of keeping the tourism economy afloat was 
more impor tant than the risk of importation of COVID-19 cases. Spain was in the 
first UK safe- travel list published on July 3, 2020; it was  later removed on July 25, 
2020, at the time with a lower incidence of COVID-19 than the United Kingdom. 
Portugal was only added to the list on August  22. The exclusion from the UK 
safe- travel list prompted a ferocious po liti cal response at the highest level, label-
ing this exclusion unfair and arbitrary. The “Race to the bottom” term was used 
to describe the competition between countries for lower taxes to attack foreign 
capital (Plümper et al., 2009). A similar efect seems to be happening in the com-
petition for tourism in southern Eu ro pean countries.
Conclusions
This chapter explores the similarities and diferences between Portugal, Spain, 
and Italy, and how they played out in the response to public health and social 
policy responses to the pandemic. Italy, Spain, and Portugal shared similar vul-
nerabilities before the pandemic started: a de cade of austerity,  limited fiscal room 
to implement new social policies, and an employment sector poorly prepared for 
working from home and vulnerable to unemployment resulting from lockdowns. 
However, Italy and Spain faced an additional challenge: a multilevel government 
structure, where taking and implementing po liti cal decisions takes more time and 
is more complicated. The inability to coordinate a fast response in the early days 
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of the pandemic seems to have played a role in the initial collapse of the health 
system in Italy and Spain and in the higher levels of excess all- cause mortality. 
Higher levels of po liti cal polarization in Spain and Italy and the weight of the 
populist far- right  were also  factors that have surely not contributed to a more 
efective po liti cal response.
In contrast, Portugal benefited not only from the early warning from Spain and 
Italy, but also from a faster, more coordinated, and po liti cally consensual response. 
The Portuguese health system avoided collapse, and mortality was kept at com-
paratively lower levels in the early stages of the pandemic. However,  after the first 
lockdown, and as restrictions eased, this relative advantage of Portugal began to 
dissipate. Deficits in state capacity and economic pressures created conditions that 
prevented the country from maintaining the previous levels of suppression of the 
transmission, leading to a prolonged plateau of the epidemic curve. As the “second 
wave” unfolded in the last quarter of 2020, the structural similarities between the 
three countries exerted their influence, leading to much less dissimilar outcomes 
than  those that could be observed at the earliest stages of the pandemic.
Note
 1. Letter from FDR to Judge Henry M. Heymann, December 2, 1919.
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